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Abstract 
Nigeria's housing problems have persisted regardless of changes in policy, strategies, 
actions and instruments.  This study examines housing policy changes and factors that 
influence housing supply outcomes at the local level. The study, first of all, reviews the 
state of housing provision in the national context. The focus is then turned to the city of 
Jos in north-central Nigeria, where institutional arrangements for the provision of 
housing are critically examined. Primary data was obtained through interviews with 
industry role players (government officers and house builders) and the views of people 
were sampled through a questionnaire survey. This data was then combined with 
secondary source material to examine financial mechanisms, subsidy provision and 
local-level organisational frameworks for partnership. The findings suggest that a shift 
from a state-led to an enabling approach for housing did stimulate the activities of 
private house-builders and primary mortgage institutions. However, their activities are 
not spread across the regions of Nigeria. The issue of equitable allocation of public 
housing across the regions of Nigeria by the federal agencies has not been addressed by 
the enabling policy framework. Further, the idea of decentralisation of housing 
provision was introduced but did not result in the formulation of strategies by the local 
authorities in Jos. The national housing policy itself appears to be ambiguous and 
difficult to implement by the authorities in Jos. The ambiguities arose because there is a 
lack of policy enforcement mechanism, political commitment, and a poor local 
organisation and coordination framework. These failures create uncertainties and risks 
for private house builders that partnered the government to access finance and 
subsidies for the provision of low-income housing in Jos. Also, there is limited 
participation of households due to lack of awareness on public policies. On the basis of 
the study's findings, some policy recommendations are made. 
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Introduction 
The history of post-independence housing in Nigeria reflects a period of state-led 
housing system (1960 to 1990) and market-led approach (1991 to contemporary times) 
(FGN-National Housing Policy, 2006). In the later period, emphasis was placed on public 
housing provision. The funding was provided through public budget while agencies 
within governmental bureaucracy were responsible for the implementation of projects. 
Through this policy arrangement, public housing projects (Ikejiofor, 1999) and site-and-
services schemes (Ademiliyi, 2010) were executed at different locations of Nigeria.  In 
 2006 there were 559,561 unprivatised  units of public housing rented across the 37 
states of Nigeria, and, of this number, 77,411 were in Lagos, the former capital of 
Nigeria, 28,062 in Abuja, the present capital, and 6,089 in Jos (FGN-National Population 
Commission, 2010 p. 151 & 173). Similarly, in the decades of the 80s and 90s, about 
12,000 to 15,000 residential plots were produced in three categories (1296 m2  size 
plots for the low-density residential areas, 648 m2 for medium-density and 360 m2 for 
high-density areas) and sold to the public via the site-and-services schemes in some 
selected locations. In spite of these efforts, the Nigerian housing situation remains in a 
state of crisis, revealing itself through quantitative shortages and the growth of urban 
slums.  
 
The problems that affected the state-led approach for housing include: one, a faulty 
allocation mechanism. This was evident in the allocation of residential plots provided 
via the site-and-services scheme, were some states got allocation while others were left 
out (UN-Habitat, 2001a p. 90; Ademiluyi, 2010 p 157). In like manner, the Federal 
Housing Authority (FHA), which has been responsible for the execution of public 
housing in the last three decades, made a cumulative success of 35,609 units in 2010. 
However, though projects were executed across 50 sites only 22 out of 37 states got an 
allocation (FGN-Federal Housing Authority, 2010). Two, the allocation arrangements at 
the institutional levels create inequity. Ogunshakin and Olayiwola (1992 p. 46) cites 
Okpala (1985) to observe that access to housing loans from the FMBN was a challenge 
to the urban poor and the middle class. Similarly, where the allocation was subject to 
the initial payment of a prescribed fee, such as that in the owner-occupier housing 
arrangement (instances in Lagos), the process was found to favour the high-income 
groups against the low. These are enduring legacy issues that are yet to be overturned, 
as will be evident in the subsequent discussion. Three, the bureaucratic management of 
housing provision failed to meet demand for public housing nationally (Ikejiofor, 1999).  
 
Four, there was a poor framework for the implementation of public housing projects. It 
was poor in the sense that implementation roles were over centralised in few agencies 
that gave a limited number of individuals power to decide on what and how things 
should be done. The result was a poor contract-administration system, which led to the 
mismanagement of public resources, contract collusion, bribery and corruption. Lastly, 
there was a tussle over who should execute housing projects at the local, between the 
Federal Government on the one hand, and the respective State Government authorities 
on the other. This was evident during the 1981 to 1985 national public housing 
programme (Ikejiofor, 1999 p. 180).  
 
Policy changes, assumptions and anticipated outcomes 
 
The change in Nigeria's housing policy was meant to address the problems stated above. 
However, it is noteworthy to mention that the policy change was compelled by the 
economic downturn of the 1980s which resulted to changes in the macro-economic 
framework for national development and the delivery of social services (Metz, 1992). In 
regard to housing, the introduction of an enabling approach within the framework of 
neoliberalism was thought to be the solution to failures of past housing programmes. 
Thus, a deregulation and privatisation programme was introduced to roll back the 
frontiers of the state while also allowing the private sector to take to the stage 
 (Adejumobi, 1991).  Theoretically, the enabling approach has its roots in the political 
economy of liberalism which is founded on principles of market dynamism and 
efficiency (Pugh, 1994).  In practice, the concept of enablement is a call for a 
fundamental shift in the role of government, from provider to enabler. This essentially 
requires governments to assume the role of mobilising the resources of other actors 
such as public organisations, the private sector (both formal and informal), 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and, most importantly, the people themselves 
(as well as facilitating their deployment for the efficient provision of housing) (UN-
HABITAT, 2004).  The changes that have occurred in the Nigerian housing system since 
the introduction of the enabling strategy in 1991 are concerned with the funding 
mechanism for housing, the provision of government subsidies and the administrative 
role of government agencies.  
 
The housing finance system introduced on the basis of the enabling approach was 
designed to operate on a number of assumptions: first, it was assumed that a 
liberalisation programme would transfer the ownership of public finance institutions to 
the private sector and that the Federal Government would institute legal and regulatory 
reform to stabilise the private finance institutions. The privatisation of public 
enterprises has been undertaken since 1999, and, as of 2005, six cement companies, five 
bricks and clay making companies, three steel rolling mills and two stone quarries have 
been privatised. On the finance side, five public Deposit Money Banks have been 
privatised, of which four were completely sold to Nigerian individuals and institutional 
investors and one was sold to a core investor.  Similarly, the government divested in 
three public-owned insurance companies through a management buy-out and core sales 
(FGN-Privatisation Programme, 2006 p.  14-17). Secondly, it was assumed that workers 
who wished to acquire houses would be willing to subscribe to the NHF scheme through 
the payment of 2.5 percent of their monthly incomes to the FMBN. The NHF scheme is 
still operational and some official records from the FMBN, published in local print media 
in October 2012, indicate that as of 2011 there were 3,647,275 subscribers to the NHF 
scheme (Ogunwusi, 2011).   
In regard to the provision of development subsidy, it was assumed that government 
authorities (Federal, State and Local government) would collaborate with the 
landowners and developers to make the proposals practical at the local level; and also, 
it was assumed that land and infrastructure subsidies along with tax exemptions would 
cut housing development costs and that this should help developers to build houses of 
different sizes at a cost below N5million (US$31,847 - April 2013 exchange rate) (FGN-
Housing Sector Reforms, 2006 p. 6).  
Decentralisation was introduced as a key operational strategy for the enabling 
approach. Interestingly, most countries that introduced enabling shelter strategies also 
introduced some form of decentralisation. Some illustrative examples include: Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, Ghana (Helmsin, 2001), Sri Lanka, Botswana, 
Kenya and Tanzania (Cohen and Stephen, 1997). Decentralisation in the context of 
federalism is not a new idea in Nigeria, but the introduction of the enabling strategy led 
to a rethinking of Nigeria's form of decentralisation. The new concepts for Nigeria were 
 deconcentration, delegation and devolution forms of decentralisation, which the UN 
agencies (UNDP, 2006), the World Bank (1998) and the Commonwealth Secretariat 
(2011) are popularising globally. Whereas deconcentration and delegation are 
connected to administrative decentralisation, devolution is political (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2011 p. 5). All these forms of decentralisation are aimed at promoting 
accountable, transparent, efficient and effective provision of social services at the local 
level (Cohen and Stephen, 1997). In this regard, the Federal Government of Nigeria 
proposed that housing provision roles should be decentralised (FGN-NHP, 2006 p. 19-
26). 
Research objectives, methods and data 
 
The failure of a state-led housing system to meet the demand for low-income housing 
led to the introduction of a new policy that was designed to operate on the basis of the 
enabling approach (FGN-NHP, 2006). However, in spite of the new policy, the housing 
crisis persisted. This paper aims to examine the effect of housing policy changes on 
housing supply outcomes in Jos, and the study fulfils two key objectives. The first is to 
scrutinise the current state of housing provision in national and local contexts. The 
second objective is to present and discuss some key findings of empirical study of the 
factors that influence the supply of low-income housing in Jos.  To fulfil these objectives, 
interviews were conducted with officers from organisations that are responsible for 
administering the provision of housing in Jos, and the participants consist of seven 
government officers and two private developers. Furthermore, people's views were 
obtained through a questionnaire survey which involved workers employed in the 
public organisations.  
 
The local authorities in Jos are specifically required to adapt the national policy decision 
in a number of ways: firstly, through the design of local-level strategies; secondly, by 
subsiding the cost of housing through the provision of land and infrastructure for 
developers; and lastly, by organising and coordinating of relevant actors (institutional 
and individuals) to achieve predetermined housing objectives. The purpose of the 
interview was to examine the extent at which the local authorities fulfil their roles in 
Jos.  A semi-structured interview was used in the discussion and this was considered 
suitable because "it provides the means of conducting an interview with a fairly open 
framework which allows focused conversation and two-way communication" (Cohen 
and Crabtree, 2006). Some of the interviews were recorded on a tape recorder where 
the respondent consented to it. This was supplemented by note-taking. In some cases, 
the respondents declined to have their voices recorded and, in such circumstances, only 
notes were taken. The interviews were designed to last for 30 minutes but some were 
less than this due to the tight schedules of the interviewees.  A non-probability 
purposive sampling technique was adopted in selecting the people to be interviewed. 
Creswell and Clark (2007) provide that purposive sampling may be used where the 
researcher intends to select participants who have experience about the central 
phenomenon or key concept being explored. In this case, people who were considered 
as role-players in the provision of housing were the target. The respondents were 
selected from the institutions that play relevant roles in housing provision. From the 
Federal Ministry for Land, Housing and Urban Development in Jos, the Controller (a 
director in the federal civil service) was interviewed. Three representatives of State 
 Government bureaucratic agencies were interviewed as follows: one Assistant Director 
from the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development; one Deputy Director from the 
Ministry of Lands, Survey and Town Planning; and one representative of the State 
Government Housing Corporation in Jos.  At the LGCs, a Senior Administrative Officer 
and a Chief Town Planning Officer (Lands) were interviewed. An officer from the 
Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) was interviewed. In addition, two private 
developers who have entered into partnership with the FMBN and the government in 
Jos were interviewed. For the purpose of analysis, the interview respondents are 
represented by alphabets as illustrated in Table 1.  
Table 1: Interview Respondents 
Interview Respondents Represented 
alphabets 
Representative of the Federal Ministry for Land, Housing and Urban Development in Jos, FG 
Representative of the State Ministry of Housing and Urban Development SG1 
Representative of the State Ministry of Lands, Survey and Town Planning SG2 
Representative of the State Government Housing Corporation in Jos HC 
Two Representatives: one each from Jos North and Jos South LGCs JN & JS 
Two Private Developers P1 & P2 
Representative of the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria MB 
Source: Authors' compilation (2013).  
 
The national housing policy was designed on the assumption that workers employed in 
public, private and informal sector organisations will participate by subscribing to a 
provident scheme (the NHF) as precondition for access to subsidised mortgage housing. 
The purpose of the questionnaire survey was to assess the level of awareness, the 
extent of participation of workers in the NHF scheme and their perceptions about the 
policy. The questionnaire was designed in two parts: the first part contained close-
ended questions which allow the respondents to tick from the options provided. The 
second part contained an open-ended question which allows respondents to comment 
freely about the national housing policy. Questionnaire method was used for this group 
of respondents because it offers the advantage of collecting information from a large 
sample in a relatively cost-effective way.  
 
The study population consisted of public sector workers employed by Federal, State and 
Local Government establishments which were situated within the territorial boundaries 
of Jos North and the South Local Government Areas of Plateau State in Nigeria. At the 
time of the field work, there were 82 Federal Government establishments, 54 State 
Government establishments and 18 Local Government Departments in the study area. 
The units of analysis in this research were individuals employed by these 
establishments and not the establishments themselves. Therefore, the aggregate of 
establishments formed the elements from which the sample population (individuals) 
was selected.  The population of public of public sector workers that were in Jos at the 
time of the study was not established due to the inability to access staff lists. The 
difficulty of accessing staff lists arose because some of the federal establishments in Jos 
are branches of national organisations and getting lists of workers in the branches 
required making official requests to head-offices, which could take a longer time to give 
their approval. In addition, staff lists in most of the organisations were protected by a 
privacy provision which made them inaccessible within a reasonable period of time and 
 the procedure for getting approval would have resulted in a substantial delay to the 
study. To overcome this challenge, a multi-stage sampling logic was adopted in order to 
arrive at a sample population. Firstly, lists of organisations that fell under the control of 
each tier of government (Federal, State and Local) in Jos were compiled into three 
clusters. The second stage involved stratifying organisations in each cluster into strata 
of allied professions and related functions. From each stratum, organisations were 
randomly selected and letters were sent to them requesting permission to conduct the 
survey. From the Federal Government cluster, seven organisations gave approval, nine 
from the State Government cluster and eight Council Departments from the Jos North 
and South Local Government cluster. The procedure followed is consistent with the 
logic recommended by Babbie (2007).  Questionnaires were sent out to workers 
through their Staff officers and also retrieved from them. In all, a total of 543 
questionnaires were administered and 410 were retrieved. Five out of 410 
questionnaires retrieved were invalid due to incomplete responses. The survey ended 
up with 405 valid questionnaires, which represent a percentage return of 74.58, and 
this forms the basis of the analysis. This sample size is considered to be adequate and as 
a justification, Taylor (2009) says that, for an unknown target population, 300 - 500 
respondents can work as long as the survey is representative. 
 
Current State of Housing in Nigeria and the Situation in Jos City 
 
Nigeria is one of the most populated and rapidly urbanising countries in Africa. The 
country has experienced a population growth from 88,992,220 in 1991 to 140,431,790 
in 2006 (FGN-NPC, 2010). At an annual growth rate of 2.4 percent, the World Bank 
(2013) estimated that the population was 158.423million in 2010.  A recent projection 
indicates that more than 60 percent of Nigerians will live in urban centres by 2025, and 
a sizeable proportion of these are likely to live in slums if action is not taken (Pepple, 
2012).  Based on this prognosis, a housing deficit of 12 - 16 million units is estimated for 
Nigeria (World Bank, 2009) and a UN projection indicates a need to provide 500,000 
units per annum for the next 40 years (Pepple, 2012) in order to overcome the shortage 
of adequate housing.   
 
The demand for housing in Nigeria already outweighs supply, and some evidence 
indicates that 85 percent of the urban population that rents properties spends over 40 
percent of their income on rent (EFIinA and FinMark Trust, 2010). The shortage of 
adequate housing is manifested in poor housing conditions and it is reported that by 
2010 only about 58 percent of Nigerians had access to improved water sources such as 
pipe-borne water, boreholes and wells (Pepple, 2012). Unemployment and poverty are 
hindrances to accessing good housing. The unemployment rate as of 2010 was 17.7 
percent among males, 24.9 percent among females and 21.1 for the whole population 
(FGN-National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). Studies have documented low wages (Ibem, 
2010) and wage disparities (Fajana 2007) as constraining factors to accessing adequate 
housing. In 2010, 55 percent of Nigerians were below the national poverty line (World 
Bank, 2012). Indeed, 84.5 percent of Nigerians were said to live on less than US$2 per 
day as of 2010 (World Bank, 2013). 
 
As indicated earlier, the previous approaches to housing provision were unsatisfactory 
in terms of overcoming the housing shortage. The government introduced a housing 
system based on the concept of enablement and participation in 1991 and this system 
 provided only 70,412 housing units by the end of 2011. Furthermore, access to credit 
remains a challenge due to high interest rates (Dung-Gwom & Mallo 2009). With the 
exception of the FMBN, which charges six percent interest on mortgage loans to 
individuals and 10 percent on Estate Development Loans to developers, the average 
lending rate in the mortgage industry was 19.5 percent in 2011 and the inflation rate 
was 12.9 in April 2012 (Central Bank of Nigera, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, the foreclosure laws in Nigeria are weak and it takes an average of 7-10 
years to adjudicate on foreclosure through the existing judicial system (Ogunsola, 
2012). This is one reason why the formal housing sector, which constitutes about 15 
percent of the housing market, is insufficient to meet demand. Similarly, securing 
reasonably priced land under the present land tenure system is a constraint to 
individuals and developers (Dada 2010). This problem is restricting opportunities for 
low and moderate income families to access adequate housing. The World Bank (2009) 
reported that 80 percent of Nigerians live in informal housing, in structures of varying 
degrees of permanence on land over which they have no ownership rights. Most of the 
land in Nigeria, 65 to 70 percents is still held under customary title and unless a piece of 
land has statutory title (that is, Certificate of Occupancy issued under the Land Use Act 
1978), it can never serve as collateral for credit in Nigeria (EFIinA and FinMark Trust, 
2010).   
 
The housing supply constraints in Jos are mostly connected to the institutional 
nationwide problems discussed above. However, there are key issues which are 
influencing the provision of low-income housing in Jos. First, there are limited activities 
of house building and financing companies in Jos. The government was expected to 
facilitate the participation of house builders and finance companies. As a result of the 
liberation programme which was introduced in the 90s, the building and construction 
industry in Nigeria began to experience the increased activity of the multinational and 
private domestic companies. Some foreign companies that entered the market include: 
Cappa & D'Alberto, Stabilini Visiononi, G. Cappa, Brunelli Construction, Satraco and 
Julius Berger. Others are Taylor Woodrow, Jackson Devos, P W Nigeria, Arbico, Arab 
Contractors, the C & C Construction, Strabag International and Stemco Engineering 
(Galleria Media Limited, 2004). These companies have severally been engaged by 
government to execute public infrastructure and building contracts, and they are 
equally involved in the execution of private contracts.  
 
There are multinational companies that are involved in the provision of public and 
private housing. Specifically, G. Cappa was contracted to build military barracks, 
housing for government workers, quarters for the Shell Petroleum Company, and it also 
provided high-income housing for sale in Lagos (G. Cappa Plc, 2005). Aribico Plc was 
contracted to construct military barracks at Ogun, staff quarters for the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) at Calabar and Akure, college hostels at Lagos and Benin, houses for sale 
at Ogun and Lagos, and it also carried out the redevelopment of 1004 units of public 
housing in Lagos (Arbico Plc, 2013). Similarly, the C & C Construction Company has 
been involved with the land reclamation project for the construction of the Eko Atlantic 
and Ocean Parade Towers on Banana Island in Lagos. This development is a public-
private initiative and when completed, it is expected to provide over a million housing 
units for sale and rent (C & C Construction, 2006). 
 
 The multinationals and some medium sized domestic companies are not well spread 
across Nigeria. As of 2004, an unexhausted list of 199 building and construction 
companies was published on the website of Galleria Media Limited and the data 
revealed that 151 companies were operating in Lagos, 22 in Abuja, six in Kaduna, nine 
in Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, and only one was in Jos, Plateau. This, indeed, confirms 
that the companies were not widely spread across Nigeria. From their respective places 
of operation, the big companies are able to pursue and execute contracts at different 
locations because their technical and administrative capacities permit them to do so. 
For example, Julius Berger Nigeria Plc, the P W Nigeria Limited, Molts Nigeria Limited, 
and Dantata & Sawoe have executed road construction, water-supply dams and 
drainage projects in Jos (Alao, 2013; Government of Plateau State, 2012; Julius Berger 
Nigeria Plc, 2010). This is not the case with small sized companies which appear to 
cluster at certain locations that give them operational advantages. This is confirmed by 
the data presented in Tables 2. 
 
Table 2: Distribution by States of the Housing Development Companies, Loan granted to them by the 
Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria and volume of housing supplied between 2005 and 2008  
States Distribution Housing 
Developers by States 
Loan allocated to Housing  
Developers between 2008 and 
2008 
Units of housing 
constructed 
Jigawa 01 - - 
Kaduna 03 - - 
Kano 00 - - 
Katsina 01 - - 
Kebbi 00 - - 
Sokoto 00 - - 
Zamfara 00 - - 
Adamawa 01 - - 
Bauchi 03  - 
Borno 01 - - 
Gombe 01 - - 
Taraba 01 - - 
Yobe 01 - - 
Benue 04 18,044,000.00  11  
FCT Abuja 35 4,504,957,524.45 2766 
Kogi 00 - - 
Kwara 03 - - 
Nasarawa 01 166,517,986.20  140  
Niger 00 6,287,377.25  missing data  
Plateau (Jos) 03 48,216,715.98  30  
Ekiti 01 - - 
Lagos 19 322,500,000.00  394  
Ogun 02 205,664,150.10 167 
Ondo 03 302,857,793.43  missing data  
Osun 01 - - 
Oyo 02 127,837,487.08  missing data 
Abia 01 - - 
Anambra 01 - - 
Ebonyi 01 -  
Enugu 04 - - 
Imo 00 - - 
Akwa Ibom 01 - - 
Bayelsa 00 - - 
Cross Rivers 00 777,855,717 missing data 
Delta 03 - - 
Edo 01 210,001,279.48  missing data 
Rivers 02 175,011,385.00  73  
 States 101 7,337,728,246.97  4061  
Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (2011) 
 
 
Low-income housing is provided mostly by the small and medium sized companies and 
for any company to participate in such activity, the policy requires that it should affiliate 
with the FMBN, from where it could access a loan to finance the project. This policy 
provision is, however, affected by the uneven spread of house-building companies in 
Nigeria.  The data presented in Table 2 indicate that only 12 out of 27 states benefitted 
from the houses provided by private developers between 2005 and 2008. Over this 
period, only 30 units were provided in Jos by a private company. This happened in Jos 
because there was only one developer who was affiliated with the FMBN and, the State 
Government Housing Corporation was not functional. Since 2009, the number of private 
developers who are affiliated with the FMBN has increased and, at the time of this study 
four were in Jos to provide low-income housing. The data in Table 3 suggest that only 
11 out of the 37 states had a functional Housing Corporation between 2005 and 2008 
and, as a result of their activities, 3045 housing units were provided.  
 
Table 3:  FMBN Loan On-Lent to Government Owned Housing Development Agencies and the Houses 
Supplied between 2005 and 2008 
 
Project location  Loan amount disbursed Number of Housing units 
constructed 
Aba  385,000,000,00 180 
Bauchi  356,449,237.00 208 
Makurdi  159,194,602.00 247 
Benin city  200,000,000.00 256 
Abeokuta  437,474,272.14 251 
Dutse  147,419,053.00 230 
Kaduna  306,946,238.30 285 
Katsina  599,644,671.20 272 
Lagos  84,000,000.00 84 
Jalingo  228,307,934.72 176 
Damaturu  299,868,100.00 856 
Total  3,204,304,108.00 3045 
FGN-Housing Sector Reforms (2006) 
 
Similarly, there is an uneven spread of the PMIs that serve as channels for the supply of 
loans from the FMBN to subscribers of the NHF.  As can be seen in Table 4, 3915 loan-
seekers were granted a mortgage between 2005 and 2008, but the beneficiaries were 
residing only in 16 out of the 37 states. Over this period, only 19 applicants were given a 
mortgage loan in Jos through the State Government PMI and the private PMIs were not 
available to complement on this. The situation remains the same at the time of this 
study. Furthermore, the data also suggest that people who were residing in states that 
had a high number of PMIs got a high number mortgages compared to those who were 
residing in states that had fewer PMIs, or even none. 
  
  
Table 4: Distribution by States, of the Primary Mortgage Institutions, amount of loan disbursed through 
them and number of beneficiaries between 2005 and 2008 
States Distribution of 
PMIs in States 
Loans disbursed 
through PMIs from 2005 
- 2008 
Number of beneficiaries 
Jigawa 01 312,460,345  1044  
Kaduna 00 - - 
Kano 02 14,763,382  20  
Katsina 00 - - 
Kebbi 01 21,022,664  45  
Sokoto 00 8,132,668  45  
Zamfara 00 - - 
Adamawa 01 - - 
Bauchi 01 144,903,660  214  
Borno 00 - - 
Gombe 00 - - 
Taraba 01 - - 
Yobe 01 15,977,154  7  
Benue 01 132,961,284  140  
FCT Abuja  07 279,456,115  310  
Kogi 01 13,047,950  7  
Kwara 01 1,564,400  2  
Nasarawa 00 - - 
Niger 01 - - 
Plateau (Jos) 01 8,092,864  19  
Ekiti 01 - - 
Lagos  51  2,323,421,277 1779 
Ogun 02 - - 
Ondo 00 - - 
Osun 01 - - 
Oyo 01 222,528,425  173  
Abia 01 - - 
Anambra 01 13,632,640  15  
Ebonyi 00 - - 
Enugu 02 - - 
Imo 01 - - 
Akwa Ibom 02 6,613,582  23  
Bayelsa 01 - - 
Cross Rivers 00 - - 
Delta 03  111,009,241 72 
Edo 00   
Rivers 00   
 85 3,628,587,692.00  3,915  
Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (2011) 
 
Secondly, the local housing market in Jos has experienced a lull in activity of small and 
medium sized house building companies. This may not be unconnected with the 
difficulty for access to finance by small and medium house builders. In like manner, the 
formal credit system is reaching a minute number of households as confirmed by recent 
study (Wapwera, Parsa and Egbu, 2011) which sampled 300 households in selected 
areas of the Jos metropolis. The study found that 75 percent of households have utilised 
informal credit sources over the last decade, while only 25 percent have utilised formal 
sources. The FMBN has its branch office in Jos to provide subsidised credit to house-
building companies and NHF subscribers, and there are Deposit Money Banks around 
the city to complement them. However, this institutional solution is evidently not being 
used. Evidence suggests that from the inception of the enabling housing approach (in 
 1991) to December 2011, less than 500 housing units have been funded through the 
subsidised credit system in Jos (FGN-FMBN, 2011). The population in Jos has been on 
the increase, from 510,300 in 1991 (Geohive, 2012) to 736,016 in 2006 (FGN-NPC, 
2010) and this is creating more demand for housing, yet the formal housing supply is 
not keeping pace with this demand. 
  
Furthermore, local institutional barriers to small and medium scale house-building 
companies exist. In its 'doing business' report for 2010, the World Bank ranked Plateau 
State at 20th (out of 37 States) in the area of enforcing contracts; 13th (out of 37 States) 
in the aspect of registering property; 24th (out of 37 States) in dealing with construction 
permits and 4th (out of 37 States) in starting a business. Plateau State was placed in 15th 
position (out of 37 States) in the overall 'ease of doing business' ranking of Nigerian 
states (The World Bank Doing Business Report, 2010). These problems require the 
attention of local authorities in Jos in order to make the business environment attractive 
for small and medium scale house-building companies to actively participate in 
increasing the supply of housing. However, this has to be matched with a supply of low-
interest finance from the FMBN and development subsidies from the local authorities in 
Jos. 
 
Lastly, there is difficulty of getting access to land for development. The problem of land 
supply in Jos is partly caused by natural constraints (such as rocky terrain), which limits 
the supply of land that can be effectively used for housing within the current 
technological and economic limits of small and medium scale estate development 
companies and self-builders. Land supply is also affected by issues such as the politics of 
control between kinship groups and government,  a distorted land market and failure to 
formalise informal land (Umezulike, 2011), poor planning, ineffective development 
control (Dung-Gwom, 2008) and delays in private developers obtaining planning 
permission (Dung-Gwom, 2001). Similarly, in urban areas of Jos, un-reclaimed mining 
ponds create a shortage of land for housing development (Mallo, 2012; Alexander, 1990 
p. 44).  
 
Discussions and Findings of Empirical Study Conducted in Jos 
 
Decentralisation and Local-level Housing Strategy  
 
The national housing policy was designed on the assumption that the decentralisation 
of roles from the Federal to State and Local Government authorities would result in the 
development of local-level strategy. The question asked in connection to this is: in 
which ways have government authorities adapted the national policy decision in Jos? 
The State Government officers confirmed that a number of strategies have been 
formulation by the authorities in Jos. For instance, SG1 confirmed that: 
 
"Our ministry was involved in the formulation of housing and urban development strategy" 
(SG1).  
 
In like manner, SG2 said: 
 
"…the design of the Greater Jos Master plan has been completed. We are now waiting for the 
State Legislature to pass the Master Plan into a law"(SG2) 
 
 The Local Government officers (JN & JS) could not confirm the existence of similar 
strategies at the level of Councils.  A further survey of documents reveals that the 
Federal Government had proposed a national development framework known as the 
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), which gave rise 
to the State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (SEEDS) at State 
government level in Jos, but this did not result in the formulation of the Local Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy (LEEDS) by Local government as was 
expected. These strategies were proposed by the Federal Government to serve as a 
framework for economic empowerment and development at national, state, and local 
levels. The strategy was designed to address issues of housing, water supply, 
infrastructure, health care, land management, education and other essential public 
sector needs. The absence of LEEDS at LGC level allows Councils in Jos to respond to 
housing issues based only on constitutional provisions rather than working within 
proposed national, state and local strategies. SG1 and 2 further confirmed that the 
NEEDS document is the main national strategy from which the State Government has 
produced other strategies. The NEEDS strategy gave rise to SEEDS in Jos. However, the 
existence of SEEDS does not provide a practical organisational framework for the 
coordination of relevant actors in directing their efforts towards predetermined 
objectives.  
 
In regards to organisation and coordination of actors, the respondents (SG1&2; FG and 
JN&JS) only commented on their activities in respect to land acquisition. There is no 
indication of an existing coordination framework. As a consequence, this study found a 
total absence of partnership between Local Government Councils and State and Federal 
Government organs in Jos for the purpose of accomplishing any pre-set housing 
objectives. Private developers were building houses in Jos with funding from the FMBN, 
but only worked with State and Federal Government organs in connection with land 
acquisition and registration. However, this was not a collective action, as the 
relationships were occurring at different levels. The Councils were found to operate in 
isolation but did have some relationship with people at the grassroots level.  This 
suggests that it is difficult to attain a uniform operational strategy for housing supply 
activity in a federal system of administration. In Nigeria, the Federal Government seems 
to push for uniformity so that proposed national strategies will account for housing 
activities at State and Local Government levels, but the autonomy of federal structures 
fosters the divergence of activity.  
 
The Provision of Development Subsidy and Cost of Housing 
In the framing of housing policy, land and infrastructure should be provided as a 
development subsidy to house-building companies. This proposal has experienced 
practical difficulties in Jos and, as such, access to land and infrastructure for housing is a 
major supply constraint. One issue that is echoed in the responses of government 
officers and developers is the existence of an ownership and control tussle over land 
between government and kinship groups or between one kinship group and another. A 
question was asked (how does government organise the provision of housing 
development subsidy in Jos?) and this sparks a number of responses. The State and 
Federal Government officers confirmed they were playing the role of helping developers 
to acquire land for housing in Jos. These roles were expressed by SG2 & 3 and FG: 
 "…we have had series of meetings with developers to help them acquire land for housing 
projects around the city" (FG).  
 
SG2 laid similar claims:  
 
"…we have settled the problem among the land owners. Government has identified five sites 
and the land owners are very much willing to sale" (SG1).  
 
SG3 made similar expression:  
 
"We have been mediating between developers and land owners to facilitate acquisition. We 
have mediated and also settled land ownership disputes between two communities and 
kinship groups on behalf of developers. We are waiting for developers to make money 
available for us to compensate land owners" (SG1)  
 
This land tussle between government and kinship groups is an issue that has been 
severally documented in other research (Umezulike, 2011) and is further corroborated 
by this study. Statutorily, government feels it holds the land in trust for the people but in 
practice the actual possession is with the kinship groups and individuals who have 
always claimed ownership. The developers expressed concern over the time it takes to 
acquire land for housing provision from the local natives in Jos and confirmed that some 
natives prefer to keep their land undeveloped. There were instances where different 
kinship groups and individuals came up to lay an ownership claim on a piece of land 
which developers were interested to acquire (confirmed by PD1 & 2). This situation 
made intervention of government officers necessary for the purpose of settling 
ownership disputes and persuading the rightful owners to sell the land in exchange for 
monetary compensation. Interestingly, the officers employed by the Federal, State and 
Local Government organs confirmed that they play this role in Jos.  
The developers tend to have a contrary view about the involvement of bureaucratic 
officials in the land acquisition process. PD1 and 2 both confirmed that the involvement 
of government officials had resulted in an unpleasant experience. They also revealed 
that government officers were unable to carryout conclusive negotiations with land 
owners. As a result, negotiations had to be repeated. The process of land acquisition 
took too long, numerous delays were experienced and developers ended up paying 
higher costs for land compensation than they ought to have paid. The expressions of 
developers revealed that they do not wish to repeat such an experience.  
 
The roles of Local Government Councils tend to be directed at the grassroots. One of the 
Local Government officers commented: 
 
"… the Council usually acquire land and after producing the layout it will then sell to 
workers and the general public at subsidised rate" (JN). 
 
Similarly, LGC2 responded that the Land and Estate Department does its routine duty of 
establishing root of title to land, processing of change of ownership and issuing of 
customary title to land. Further to this, the Council has been acquiring land for sale to its 
workers and the public. LGC2 cited an instance: 
 
 "In the last layout, we produced 300 plots, each measuring 50ft x 100ft. The Local 
Government Council decided to allocate 150 plots to its staff and the rest were sold to 
people residing in the local government area"(JS). 
 
The housing related activities of LGCs are more to do with land administration than the 
provision of housing. Similarly, the State and Federal Government officers were only 
able to explain their roles in relation to land, as opposed to the overall administration of 
housing provision. 
 
The second problem identified in Jos is the issue of high cost of land acquisition. This 
was raised by the developers interviewed, and individuals who responded to the 
questionnaire also corroborate this.  The developers confirmed that they were 
responsible for the payment of the full cost of land acquisition because the government 
was unwilling to bear this responsibility. The government officers confirmed this failure 
as well, and, to support the position of the State Government, an officer confirmed that it 
was not the government's responsibility to bear the cost of land for housing 
development in Jos. For instance SG1 said: 
"…we are waiting for developers to make money available for us to compensate land 
owners" (SG1).  
 
The failure of State Government to bear the cost of financing infrastructure raises 
concerns to developers. A question was presented to the developers: how do you 
finance the cost of infrastructure provision. PD1 responded: 
 
"…we have heard a lot promises from the State and Federal Government but nothing is 
forthcoming. The political leaders are always complaining of a lack of finance. In short, 
they don't provide it at all" (PD1). 
 
PD1 further adds that the FMBN is helping to tackle the infrastructure issues by 
granting additional loans of up to 70% of the total cost of providing infrastructure to 
their project site. This loan will have to be paid off by adding it to the cost of the houses 
produced. PD1 said this inflates the cost of houses beyond what is expected but that 
there is no alternative: clearly, the off-takers (NHF subscribers) have to pay higher cost 
on their houses as well. This would not happen if they had received subsidies for 
development. 
 
PD2 responded:  
"At our project site, we thought that government will help with the cost of infrastructure 
but nothing happened even after we approached them with a request. …we decided to 
use our money to provide roads, electricity and water. Part of the cost incurred was 
transferred to the end users so that the cost of three bedroom bungalow went up to 
N5.3million, three bedroom semi-detached house went for N4.8million and two 
bedrooms semi-detached was sold for N4.3million" (PD2).  
 
This is a clear failure of the proposed land and infrastructure subsidy, and it has a 
negative implication for the cost of houses provided by developers in Jos. As a result of 
this failure, there has been an increase in cost of subsidised housing. This is so because 
the developers were left without an option other than to incur the extra cost to finance 
 land acquisition and the provision of infrastructure. This led to over spending on the 
costs of project. The developers tried to recover the extra cost incurred and, in 
achieving this, they made an upward review of selling prices, so that a three-bedroom 
detached house unit was sold above the N5 million (US$31,847) ceiling set by the 
Federal Government. However, the two- and three-bedroom semi-detached units were 
sold at a price below the ceiling (see details in Table 5). This experience is not peculiar 
to developers in Jos. By September 2009, housing projects funded through the FMBN 
arrangement were completed at 25 different locations including Jos (Salami, 2009 pp. 
18-20). However, some developers could not sell houses to the target groups (NHF 
subscribers) because they incurred additional expenses in financing the provision of 
residential infrastructure and they needed the government's permission to approve an 
upward review of housing unit costs to cover actual production costs in order to make a 
profit from their venture. For instance, the unit cost of houses produced by some 
developers had to be reviewed from N3.9m (US$24,840) to N4.48m (US$28,535) to 
cover the additional costs incurred. This scenario was common in cities where 
anticipated government subsidies were not provided (Salami, 2009 p. 18). 
Table 5: Cost of Low Income Mortgage Housing in Jos 
House types Average unit cost in Nigerian Naira US$ equivalent 
2 bedrooms semi-detached house 4.3 million 26,875 
3 bedrooms semi-detached house 4.8 million 30,000 
3 bedrooms detached house 5.3 million 33,125 
 Source: Field Survey in Jos, Nigeria (September, 2012) 
Assessing the Level of awareness and participation of workers in the NHF Scheme 
 
This section examines the level of awareness and participation of workers in the NHF 
scheme.  The analysis is based on 405 valid questionnaires and the sample population 
consists of 270 male subjects (representing 67.2%) and 132 females (who represent 
32.8%). The distribution of subjects according to tier of government employed indicates 
that 35.6% (144 subjects) were employed in Federal Government organisations; 38.5% 
(156 subjects) were employed in State Government organisations and 25.9% (105 
respondents) were employed in Local Government Council departments. From the 
sample population, 51.5% (208 subjects) have worked for less or equal to 14 years; 
35.6 % (144 subjects) have been in public sector job in the range of 15 - 28years while 
12.9% (52 subjects) have worked for 29 years or more. The subjects comprise of 17.6 % 
(70 subjects) low cadre within grade levels 01-06; 60.1% (239 subjects) are middle 
cadre within grade levels 07 - 12 while 22.4% (89 subjects) are high cadre. Regarding 
their incomes, 55.0% (222 subjects) feel 'good' about their income; 14.9% (60 subjects) 
said their income was 'neither good nor bad'; 30.2% (122 subjects) felt their income 
was 'bad'. These variables summarise the attributes of workers being examined. 
 
In order to confirm the level of participation of workers in the NHF scheme, the 
question asked is: do you currently participate in NHF scheme? From the sampled 
population 43.3% (175 subjects) said they were participating in NHF while 56.7% (230 
subjects) said they were not. The next question was a probe with a view to identify the 
reasons for not participating in the NHF scheme.  Out of 230 subjects (figure 1) that 
responded to the question, 45.6% (104 respondents) said they were unaware of the 
 existence of NHF scheme; 17.9% (40 subjects) said they did not wish to participate 




Figure 1: Reasons for not subscribing to the NHF Scheme among workers in Jos 
 
The data presented in figure 1 suggest that lack of awareness is an important reason for 
non-participation advanced by workers who do not currently participate in the NHF 
scheme. This finding supports the conclusion of Adedokun et al (2011 p. 471), who 
submitted that a lack of awareness accounts for the poor performance of the NHF 
scheme nationwide. The interview conducted corroborates this finding. During 
interview, a question was presented (How far has the FMBN gone in mobilising workers 
to subscribe to the NHF scheme in Jos?) to an officer (MB) that works with the agency 
(FMBN) responsible for administering the NHF scheme in Jos. The response was: 
  
"…there is a lack of awareness about the NHF scheme. This arises from a lack of resources to 
embark on an enlightenment campaign by the FMBN in Jos" (MB). 
 
It is clear that lack of awareness about the NHF policy is causing a setback to its success 
in Jos. Next to the lack of awareness is the problem of enforcement. On this, MB 
responded that:  
 
 "We are experiencing problem with enforcement of the NHF scheme. The scheme was 
introduced by an Act of Parliament… Unfortunately there are recalcitrant organisations that 
are not willing to obey the law. Some organisations here in Jos have refused to let their 
workers contribute to the scheme even though it is mandatory" (MB). 
 
The comment of MB is a clear indication that the housing finance policy is experiencing 
operational challenges.  Firstly, there is a concern arising from the lack of enforcement 
power.  In Jos, the FMBN require the assistance of employers to be able to mobilise 
subscriptions from workers. It is clear that the FMBN can only fulfil this role when 
employers cooperate by encouraging their employees to subscribe to the NHF scheme. 
The employers have a role to deduct 2.5% from the monthly salaries of their workers 


























Reasons for not subscribing to the NHF Scheme 
 arising from the lack of awareness about NHF scheme and the activities of the FMBN 
among workers and their employers in Jos. Lastly, the FMBN is constraint by the lack of 
sufficient resources to undertake an extensive awareness campaign in and around the 
city of Jos.  
Perceptions of workers about Housing Finance Policy 
The workers gave several reasons for not subscribing to the NHF scheme. From the 
comments provided by workers, it is deduced that employers and the Labour Union 
have an overbearing influence over the ability of workers to participation in the NHF 
scheme. For instance, some workers wrote that: 
 
"My employer refused to let us participate". "The Labour Union stopped us from 
participating in the NHF".  
 
In addition to the influence of employers and the Labour Union, some workers thought 
the NHF scheme is no longer operational and others expressed lack of happiness about 
the arrangement. Some of the comments are as follows: 
 
"The NHF scheme is dead".  The NHF doesn't operate". "My place of work is not captured on 
the NHF scheme". "We were forced to join the NHF scheme".  
 
Similar responses appeared in several completed questionnaires, cutting across 
workers employed in Federal and State Government agencies. The workers employed in 
the LGC departments wrote in several completed questionnaires that: 
 
There is no NHF provision for the Local Government Council workers"  
 
This particular comment suggests that workers employed in LGC departments are 
deprived of the opportunity of participating in NHF scheme.  Some comments convey the 
feeling of exclusion and mistrust. For example, some workers said: 
 
"I would like to decide on the type of house to buy. With the NHF scheme it is not like that 
because developers build to their specifications and not to our taste"  
 
Another respondent said: 
 
"Government policies have been very unstable and I can't trust the housing policy" 
 
The issue of lack of trust was a strident revelation and the responses were consistent. 
Indeed, the workers in Jos are not confident about government's policy and they raise an 
issue of lack of transparency and corruption. This is confirmed by the following 
responses: 
 
"…even when a worker makes contribution to the NHF scheme, the money is eaten by 
corrupt officials. The FMBN needs to be privatised" 
 
"Government is only interested in deducting staff salaries without anything coming out of the 
new housing arrangement"  
 
"The operators of the NHF scheme are not honest at all, after being on waiting list for a long 
period one's turn will never come"  
 
 All the comments provided by workers are a clear indication of the negative perceptions 
they hold against the NHF scheme. These negative perceptions are capable of putting 
workers off from subscribing to the NHF scheme. Thus, the government needs to create 
awareness about the benefits of the scheme and at the same put in place a mechanism 
that will empower the FMBN to enforce employers and their employees to comply.  
Because of the influence that employers and the Labour Union have over their workers, 
government could partner with them in the implementation process.  
 
Local-level politics and provision of subsidised housing in Jos 
 
Lack of political support is playing out in a number of ways which have a combined 
effect on the supply of new housing in Jos. Some workers in Jos complained of 
employers not allowing them the opportunity to subscribe to the NHF scheme and the 
representative of the FMBN interviewed in Jos also corroborated this view. 
Furthermore, where workers are employed by different tiers of government, as is the 
case in the public sector, the FMBN would require the support of employers and 
political leaders at each level to mobilise workers into the NHF scheme. This suggests 
the NHF scheme and the ability of the FMBN to mobilise participation can only have 
legitimacy with the support of employers and political leaders at Federal, State and 
Local Government levels. Also, the Housing Corporations owned by the Federal 
Government (Federal Housing Authority - FHA) and the State Government in Jos 
(Plateau Investment and Property Development Company - PIPC) were found not to be 
involved in housing provision.  One of the respondents (HC) specifically commented on 
the State Government Housing Corporation: 
 
"The company (PIPC) is owned by the State Government and so it only engages in projects 
that the government feel are viable such as shopping centres" (HC).  
 
These are areas where Federal and State Government politicians have demonstrated a 
lack of commitment in order to allow government agencies to operate from a privileged 
position to make a significant contribution to supply of low-income housing. The local-
level politics and bureaucratic control of public organisations by politicians is an issue 
of concern to developers.  For example, PD1 said:  
 
"…we applied for land title documents at a time when the government was planning to 
computerise the land registry. The Governor decided to place embargo on issuance of C of O 
for approximately three years. This action alone halted our housing activities in Jos" (PD1).  
 
PD2 concurred with PD1: 
"Land registration process has improved a little in Jos. It took about 12 months for us to 
obtain land title document after making application. Before submitting our application the 
State Government suspended land registration process for three years. This created 
problems to developers who needed to obtain title documents at the time. It was a significant 
delay for investors" (PD2) 
 
Furthermore, there is an issue which concerned the exercise of administrative power 
over land between State and Local Government authorities and their capability to 
provide support for developers to acquire land and access title documents. The city of 
Jos is urbanising quickly. The two LGAs/LGCs (Jos North and South) have grown into 
one city which is also urbanising quickly to further merge with other neighbouring 
 LGAs/LGCs (Bassa, Barkin Ladi, Jos east and Riyom). As suburban LGCs/LGAs integrate 
into the Jos urban area, the authorities may lose administrative power over land to the 
State Government. This is because the Land Use Act of 1978 only gives LGC authorities 
administrative power in respect to suburban land but when the lands become part of an 
urban area, such power is transferred to the State Government.  Since 2009, the State 
Government has produced a new Greater-Jos master plan which covers the suburbs of 
the four suburban LGAs/LGCs (Government of Plateau State, 2009). The new master-
plan was awaiting passage into law at the time of the study and as soon as this is 
successful, the State Government will begin to administer the affected areas as part of 
the urban land. The concern about this development is that the power to grant statutory 
rights, which the developers need in order to access finance to build houses in and 
around Jos, will become more concentrated in the State Government land registry and 
will also be monopolised by the State Governor. This development will possibly 
undermine the idea of decentralisation and the anticipated role of Local Government 
authorities.  
Lastly, there are practical difficulties around the arrangement for the supply of 
development subsidies. The developers and government officers confirmed the 
government's failure to subsidise the cost of primary infrastructure (road, water and 
electricity) as it was proposed in the housing policy. This failure is not unconnected to 
absence of a supporting legislation which can institutionalise and legitimise the practice 
in bureaucratic institutions at the local level.  
Uncertainties and investment risk for private house-builders 
The supply of new housing through the subsidised credit market is substantially carried 
out by public bureaucracies some of which create unfavourable conditions for the 
financial investors and risks for small and medium scale house building companies. The 
developers in Jos expressed concern over a delay that was experienced before they 
were able to acquire land. After acquiring the land the developers were faced with a 
further delay from the process of obtaining C of O from the State Government land 
registry. Similarly, the process of accessing finance from the FMBN was also associated 
with a delay. Though the developers were silent over the delays associated with 
obtaining building permits, a recent study by the World Bank (2010 p. 45) recorded 15 
procedures which took an average of 84 days to accomplish in Jos. These findings 
suggest the presence of multiple risks that affect the activities of small- and medium-
scale developers. Future study will examine this aspect. 
Conclusions and policy recommendations 
The study was set out to examine changing housing policies in Nigeria and housing 
provision in the city of Jos. A number of conclusions are reached on the basis of the 
study's findings and policy recommendations are proffered:  
1 The shift from a state-led to an enabling approach for housing did stimulate the 
activities of private house-builders and primary mortgage institutions. However, their 
activities are not spread across the regions of Nigeria. The limited activity of private 
house building companies in Jos is due to the unfavourable investment environment. 
This situation could be reversed if the local authorities undertake a number of reforms: 
firstly, the bureaucratic agencies responsible for issuing of building permits are 
 requiring reforms that could speed up their operations. Secondly, the land titling 
process is associated with unnecessary delays. The government could overcome this by 
reforming the relevant agencies or providing a special arrangement whereby house-
building companies could obtain land tittle documents without delays. Lastly, the 
Council officers in Jos appear to have a good understanding of kinship relations and how 
they affect the land acquisition process and are able to manoeuvre to acquire the land to 
sell to the public. If Councils were given more power to issue C of O titles on urban land, 
they could be more helpful to the developers than the State and Federal Government 
agencies and their officers, who appear to have less understanding of the grassroots 
arrangement. 
 
2 The issue of equitable allocation of public housing across the regions of Nigeria 
by the federal agencies has not been addressed by the enabling policy framework. The 
federal agencies tend to allocate housing across the regions by political and 
administrative decision, and this creates inequity in the allocation process. This 
situation can possibly be corrected if allocation is made based on need and demand. To 
achieve this, the three tiers (federal, state and local) of government will have to partner 
together to undertake periodic housing need and demand assessment in all the cities, 
towns and villages in Nigeria. The resulting data can be used as a basis for housing 
allocation. Evidence (Monk, Clark and Grant, 2011) suggests that this approach is 
helpful in the allocation of housing in Britain and the UN-Habit advocates its use in 
developing countries. Specifically, the UN-Habitat advocates that the developing 
countries should undertake housing profile, and use this to inform housing and urban 
policy (UN-Habitat, 2010). 
 
3 The idea of decentralising of housing provision roles was introduced on the 
assumption that it will help in the formulation of local-level housing strategies and the 
coordination of housing provision. In Jos, decentralisation did help in formulation of 
strategies by the State Government authorities but did not result in the formulation of 
strategies by the Local Government Councils.  This problem tends to arise from the 
practice of federalism whereby the Federal Government of Nigeria is constitutionally 
allowed to have overbearing influence over the State and Local Governments. In like 
manner the State Government is having overbearing influence over the LGCs. Also, the 
framework for policy formulation is based on a top-down fashion where the Federal 
Government authorities make policies and pass down to State and Local Government 
levels. In some instances, the federal policies do not suit local and contextual conditions. 
The issue of federalism need to be reconsidered in Nigeria and the government can 
learn from the practice of federalism in other countries.  In Germany for example, the 
federal government is assigned a greater legislative role and the Land (regional) 
governments a greater administrative role (Baier, Kroll and Zenker, 2013 pp. 20-21). 
Furthermore, the areas of shared responsibility for the Lander and the federal 
government are clearly defined, and there are joint areas of action for instance in 
regional economic development. However, the Landers retain significant powers for 
autonomous revenue generation. In German's federalism, there is a minimal use of 
mixed federal-state funding but there exist a statutory provision for federal financial 
assistance to the Landers (Baier, Kroll and Zenker, 2013 pp. 20-21). Nigeria could 
borrow from this practice by clearly dividing legislative powers and abolishing of 
framework legislation and policy formulation. In addition, the responsibilities for 
 housing provision for the three tiers of governments need to clearly define and 
legitimise in the federal constitution.  
 
4 The subsidy proposal which requires local authorities to provide land and 
infrastructure for low income housing is experiencing practical challenges in Jos.  The 
LGC do fulfil this role but their efforts benefits the informal house-builders to the 
exclusion of formal developers. The State and Federal Government agencies completely 
refused to accept the role of subsiding housing development. As a consequence, the cost 
of low-income housing goes beyond the limit set by the Federal Government.  This 
problem arises from two possible reasons: one, there is a lack of legislation and political 
commitment in support of the subsidy proposals. As it is clearly evident, the national 
housing policy decision is a necessary condition for low-income housing provision but 
not sufficient for its practice at the local-level. Thus, the enactment of legislation by the 
State Government and a bye-law by Local Government Councils will help to legitimise 
the housing policy decision and the subsidy proposal in the local-level agencies. In 
addition, the endorsement of the proposal by political leaders in Jos will be helpful. Two, 
the absence of local-level partnership among agencies responsible for organising 
housing supply partly accounts for the failure. This study found that among the agencies 
that are responsible for various organisational roles within housing provision, none is 
dominant over the others in the coordination of the relevant actors in the partnership. It 
is for these reasons that there is no partnership of institutions whose actions are 
directed at predetermined housing supply goals.  There is need for the State and Local 
Government authorities to provide a framework for local-level coordination and 
organisation of housing provision in Jos. Such a framework should specify roles and 
responsibilities for the local agencies, and possibly be legitimised by local-level 
legislation.  
 
5 With regard to finance, the people in Jos are not aware of the policy, hence, a 
very low participation of workers in the NHF scheme.  There is also a problem of 
mistrust about government policy. These call for a sensitisation and enlightenment of 
the public about government policy, its benefits and how people can benefit from it. It 
also calls for sincerity, transparency and accountability to the public. If government is 
able to do these, it will reverse the negative perceptions that workers have against the 
policy of government. 
 
6 Finally, the study found that the combined failures of the Federal Government 
and those of the local authorities contribute to the poor supply of low-income housing 
in Jos. These conclusions are prompting for further empirical study to examine the 
participation of local and foreign institutional investors in the supply of housing finance 
through the FMBN. In like manner, the extent of Federal Government's participation, 
through the supply of public finance to support the FMBN as it promise was not 
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